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Lucas John Matthews, and Daniel Molter
The modern synthesis in evolutionary biology is taken to be that period in 
which a consensus developed among biologists about the major causes of 
evolution, a consensus that informed research in evolutionary biology for 
at least a half century. As such, it is a particularly fruitful period to consider 
when refl ecting on the meaning and role of chance in evolutionary explana-
tion. Biologists of this period make reference to “chance” and loose cognates 
of “chance,” such as: “random,” “contingent,” “accidental,” “haphazard,” or 
“stochastic.” Of course, what an author might mean by “chance” in any spe-
cifi c context varies.
In the following, we fi rst off er a historiographical note on the synthesis. 
Second, we introduce fi ve ways in which synthesis authors spoke about 
chance. We do not take these to be an exhaustive taxonomy of all possible 
ways in which chance meaningfully fi gures in explanations in evolutionary 
biology. These are simply fi ve common uses of the term by biologists at this 
period. They will serve to organize our summary of the collected references to 
chance and the analysis and discussion of the following questions:
• What did synthesis authors understand by chance?
• How did these authors see chance operating in evolution?
• Did their appeals to chance increase or decrease over time during the syn-
thesis? That is, was there a “hardening” of the synthesis, as Gould claimed 
(1983)?
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H i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l  N o t e
What was the synthesis? When did it begin, and when did it end? Who were 
the major participants? And what did they synthesize? There is a good deal 
of debate among historians of biology about the meaning of the synthesis: 
its aims and scope, its participants, and when it began and ended (see, e.g., 
Burian 1988; Gayon 1998; Cain 1994; Smocovitis 1994b, 1994a, 1996; Depew 
and Weber 1995; Largent 2009; Cain and Ruse 2009; M. J. S. Hodge 2011; 
Delisle 2009, 2011; Provine 1971). We grant that there is no single way to tell 
the story of the synthesis; so we choose to be ecumenical and include as many 
potentially relevant fi gures as possible and as permissive a periodization as 
possible (though we must be selective in our discussion of representative 
fi gures, due to limitations of space). Arguably, the earliest infl uential docu-
ment of the twentieth century that qualifi es as synthetic is R. A. Fisher’s “The 
Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance” 
(1918), which established the compatibility of a multifactorial (or Mendelian) 
theory of inheritance with a “biometrical” view of quantitative traits, or traits 
with continuous distribution, which selection might gradually shift over time. 
This laid the groundwork for what is sometimes called the orthodox view of 
the synthesis, as explained and defended in Mayr and Provine’s (1980) vol-
ume, according to which the major fi gures of the synthesis came to broad 
agreement on the view that gradual selection on minor genetic variants is 
largely responsible for the diversifi cation and adaptation we see today. Mac-
roevolution—the divergence of species and lineages—does not require appeal 
to causal factors over and above those deployed in microevolutionary theory, 
according to this orthodox view. The major texts of the synthesis provided 
arguments and evidence in support of this general theoretical agreement.
The “orthodox” view, of course, foregrounds agreement upon empirical 
and theoretical principles of evolution, but it is also surely the case that the 
synthesis was constituted by self- conscious actors, who aimed at the forma-
tion and institutionalization of the discipline of evolutionary biology. In the 
1940s, Mayr launched the Society for the Study of Evolution and its asso-
ciated journal, Evolution; he also was instrumental in organizing important 
meetings, drawing together biologists with diff erent areas of specialization 
from around the globe to establish a more interdisciplinary biology, and es-
tablishing centers of research and common curricula. That is, the synthesis 
was not only a scientifi c change, but also a sociological and institutional one 
(Cain 1994; Smocovitis 1994b, 1994a). The name “modern synthesis” was 
coined by Julian Huxley (1942), whose book Evolution: The Modern Synthesis 
Chance in Evolution, edited by Grant Ramsey, and Charles H. Pence, University of Chicago Press, 2016. ProQuest Ebook
         Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=4520143.
Created from utah on 2018-07-04 13:11:46.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
hi
ca
go
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
78 Chapter Three
was both a comprehensive overview of then current biology and an articula-
tion of a research program. The theoretical work and organizational events of 
the synthesis spanned roughly three decades, from about 1920 to 1950.
This period exhibited a fl uctuation of views about the role(s) of chance 
in evolution, eventuating in a “hardening,” or emphasis on selection (Gould 
1983) that continued well past the synthesis period. The stabilization of the 
modern synthesis view on chance (insomuch as there was a stable view) was 
established fi rmly in the 1940s, and the major texts of this period all signifi -
cantly drew upon the population genetic documents published during the 
“early phase” of the modern synthesis, primarily accomplished by Haldane, 
Fisher, and Wright in the 1920s and 1930s. Signifi cant further work was done 
in the 1940s and ’50s, making clear the relationships of ecology to evolution 
and of paleontology to systematics.
In contrast to the “orthodox” view just described, Cain (2009) proposes 
that we abandon the “unit concept” of the evolutionary synthesis altogether 
and suggests that we shift focus to a wider range of transformations in the 
biological sciences during the 1930s. Historians’ prior assumptions that the 
synthesis was a single event, bounded in time, that there was a single theory 
endorsed by synthesis participants, and the very idea that “conjunction is 
meaningful,” he claims, are all mistaken. Instead, Cain argues that we should 
focus on “organizing threads” of research into the nature of species and spe-
ciation, experimental taxonomy, and the shift from object- to process- based 
biology. We agree that historians ought to be wary of identifying the synthesis 
exclusively with agreement on what we have called the orthodox view above. 
Cain usefully suggests that we should think of the period as one involving 
“problem complexes.” He identifi es four: selection, variation, heredity, and 
divergence. To be sure, all four problems were central matters of interest for 
biologists during this period. But there are diff erent and perhaps equally 
informative ways to decompose the synthesis. For instance, Gayon’s com-
prehensive Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival (1998) focuses on diff erent 
yet nonetheless core problem complexes: defending “Darwinism” from its 
(perceived) detractors and integrating genetics with evolution. To be clear, 
we don’t see these approaches as in opposition, but simply as focusing on 
distinct aspects of the same historical period, akin to Wimsatt’s view that the 
same system can be decomposed in multiple ways (Wimsatt 1972). Not unlike 
the fruit fl y, the modern synthesis is a complex historical process that can be 
decomposed in many diff erent ways.
We contend that a variety of problem complexes, goals, questions, and 
methods—theoretical as well as pragmatic or institutional—is not incompat-
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ible with general agreement on certain core views about evolutionary change. 
While the retrospective emphasis on classical population genetics may have 
been oversold (as historians of population genetics themselves have argued; 
see, e.g., the new preface to Provine 1986 in the 1989 edition), there was cer-
tainly agreement upon a core set of commitments, what Burian has called a 
“meta” theory (Burian 1988) or research program, in service of addressing 
a suite of questions about the evolution and diversity of life. What was im-
portant to authors of the late synthesis was not what the models of classical 
population genetics required, but what they permitted. The core elements of 
the classical models describe how evolution would progress, under certain 
assumptions, leaving open to empirical investigation how frequently those as-
sumptions are met in the world. Thus, diff erent synthesis authors were free 
to disagree on the relative signifi cance of selection and drift. Nonetheless, we 
contend that there was a shared family of commitments about the operation 
of chance in evolution throughout the synthesis, at the level of segregation and 
assortment of genes, patterns of mating, probabilistic processes like selection, 
and “random” events (such as fl oods or earthquakes) that might lead to eco-
logical or geographical isolation. We turn now to a characterization of these 
distinct forms of chance.
F i v e  S e n s e s  o f  C h a n c e
There were (at least) fi ve diff erent senses of chance at play in the synthesis.1 
First, one might assume appeals to chance in science to be making metaphysi-
cal claims about the world as fundamentally indeterministic. Only rarely, 
however, is the question of determinism or indeterminism addressed overtly 
during the synthesis. Dobzhansky (1956, 1962, 1967) and Haldane (1942) 
wrote works toward the end of their careers that touched on philosophical 
issues such as free will and indeterminism, and interest in such questions was 
a lifelong passion of Sewall Wright (Provine 1986). However, through 1950, 
when appealing to chance, most synthesis authors were silent about “quan-
tum indeterminacy.” Indeterminism in physics did play an important role 
for Fisher (1934), and we will discuss this in further detail below. But for the 
most part, when discussing chance, such authors are referring to events and 
processes at a relatively macro scale: segregation of genes, isolation of small 
subpopulations, and so on.
Second, the term chance is sometimes used interchangeably with random. 
There are more and less precise senses of random; the most precise sense is 
the notion of a random variable. Random sampling from a uniform distribu-
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80 Chapter Three
tion results in outcomes that are equiprobable; sampling from nonuniform 
distributions results in outcomes that are not equiprobable. When speaking 
of random mating or random sampling of alleles in the process of meiosis, 
most synthesis authors appear to be referring to a sampling process whose 
outcomes are assumed to be equiprobable. Or, in such cases, the outcome 
(of a mating with type X or Y, or allocation of allele A or a) is spoken of as 
random, simply in the sense that two (or more) outcomes are equiprobable. 
Other times when authors referred to random mutation, they meant “random 
with respect to fi tness” (i.e., mutation was not “directed” or a response to 
environmental challenges, as some Lamarckians claimed). Sometimes, how-
ever, when an event like mutation was spoken of as random, the author may 
have meant that its chance of occurring is unpredictable (in the epistemic 
sense) or, in contrast, is due to indeterministic processes (ontic). The ambi-
guity may have been deliberate, as so little was known about the mechanisms 
 underpinning mutation at this point (Sahotra Sarkar, pers. comm., April 13, 
2013). That is, given the limited understanding of the structure of the gene 
and the causes of mutation at the molecular and submolecular levels at the 
time, the authors indeed meant that they were unsure about the relevance 
of quantum indeterminacy (though see, e.g., Sloan and Fogel 2011 for a dis-
cussion of  the  “Three- Man Paper” and the role of radiation in mutation at 
the time).
Third, and most often, chance is frequently used as a proxy for probabil-
ity. For instance, possession of a trait might raise (or lower) the chances of 
some outcome. All synthesis authors speak of natural selection as a matter of 
probabilities, or as probabilistic in this sense: even exceptionally high fi tness 
does not guarantee survival or reproductive success, but only increases in or-
ganisms’ “chances.” Likewise, the chance (probability) that a random gene 
combination is adaptive was thought to be very low (S. Wright 1932, 358). 
The chances of various outcomes are thus spoken of as “high” or “low,” when 
outcomes are unequally probable.
Fourth, events such as fl oods, storms, meteorites crashing into the earth, 
and volcanoes are sometimes spoken of by synthesis authors as chance, ran-
dom, or, interchangeably, contingent events. Such events are chancy in the 
sense that they are rare and they result in (usually nonfortuitous) outcomes 
for organisms, lineages, and species, which are unusual, “unlucky” or not pre-
dictable, given existing biogeography, survivorship, or ongoing ecological cir-
cumstances. Volcanic explosions, mutations, lightning strikes, and other ran-
dom events in this sense are uncorrelated (either as events or in their eff ects) 
Chance in Evolution, edited by Grant Ramsey, and Charles H. Pence, University of Chicago Press, 2016. ProQuest Ebook
         Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=4520143.
Created from utah on 2018-07-04 13:11:46.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
hi
ca
go
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Anya Plutynski, Kenneth Blake Vernon, Lucas John Matthews, and Daniel Molter 81
with other causes that shape evolution (e.g., selection). In other words, such 
events disrupt current trends—by dividing landscapes, wiping out resources, 
or eliminating or isolating groups that would otherwise be physically continu-
ous and interbreeding.
Fifth, and fi nally, chance is often used to refer to outcomes in contradistinc-
tion to, or “opposing” selection. Wright speaks of both drift and mutation as 
“chance” factors that “oppose” selection (S. Wright 1932, 359). Admittedly, 
this is in part due to the fact that the outcomes of drift and mutation are ran-
dom, in the second sense defi ned above. For a particular trait and environ-
ment, selection will have a predictable “direction,” whereas drift and mutation 
result in outcomes that are (relatively) unpredictable. Such chance outcomes 
are not “directed,” either toward some desired (adaptive) outcome or toward 
any outcome in particular. Most synthesis authors assumed that mutations 
were most often deleterious. So the direction of mutation was predictable in 
the sense that it was generally assumed that adaptive mutations are rare. Sec-
ond, the direction of drift at the population level is a reduction in heterozygos-
ity, as small sample sizes of fi nite populations are likely to have a smaller rep-
resentation of variation than the original population sampled. In this sense, at 
least, drift results in a “predictable” outcome. Nonetheless, many synthesis 
authors often assimilated “non- directional” changes in gene frequency with 
whatever “opposes” the direction of selection. This, though, should not be 
interpreted as the claim that drift is “whatever we cannot explain”; synthesis 
authors were at pains to identify which empirical facts are of relevance to test-
ing claims that one of the two factors was at work, and how.
In sum, what synthesis authors meant by chance in any particular in-
stance was context dependent. A chance event was often defi ned in terms of 
a contrast, for example, with a “directional” cause, process, or tendency, or 
a predicted outcome. Appeals to chance events or outcomes were often in 
contradistinction to, or “opposing,” a particular predicted outcome. Given the 
rarity of adaptive mutations, one often cannot predict, for example, when and 
where a fortuitous mutation will come about; nor can one predict whether 
isolation of a small subpopulation will yield a fortuitous gene combination. 
Such events might then be spoken of as “due to chance,” which is just to say 
that the author did not know precisely when particular such events would 
occur, though he or she could predict that, as a general category, such events 
are rare. And an author could model chance processes as akin to processes of 
random sampling, one of the insights that theoretical population geneticists 
brought to the table.
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A i m s  a n d  M e t h o d s
Our aim here is to survey the uses and meanings of these terms in the context 
of the early and later synthesis, as well set their use(s) in a larger context in 
order to address the questions we laid out in the introduction.
We document below uses of the term chance and its (loose) cognates ran-
dom, probable, by accident, and so forth in the major texts of the synthesis 
authors. We realize that the choice of major texts is somewhat arbitrary. How-
ever, in part due to limitations of space, we opted to focus on those texts that 
we see as representative of key views on the role of chance by major fi gures 
in the synthesis period: Fisher’s The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection 
(1930), Wright’s 1931 and 1932 papers; Dobzhansky’s fi rst (1937) and third 
(1951) editions of Genetics and the Origin of Species; Mayr’s Systematics and 
the Origin of Species (1942); Simpson’s Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944); 
and Stebbins’s Variation and Evolution in Plants (1950).2 We have chosen to 
compare early and late editions of Dobzhansky’s Genetics and the Origin of 
Species because they illustrate in a striking way a shift of perspective on the 
relative signifi cance of chance in evolution over the course of what Gould 
(1983) has called a “hardening” of the synthesis.
Understanding how and in what sense chance was understood by synthesis 
authors requires more than a summary of their particular views; also required 
are a careful comparison and contrast of their distinct uses of the term and its 
cognates and an understanding of its relevance to the process of evolution. 
The synthesis authors referred to chance not infrequently, but, as we’ve said, 
with meanings that depended importantly on context. By and large, the most 
common use of the term chance is simply as proxy for probability or probable, 
as in, “the chances of fi xation of a novel gene are low in a small population.” 
The second most common is as a proxy for random. “Chance,” or “random,” 
mating occurs when distinct types of organism in a population may be equally 
likely to mate with one another.
Many authors treat senses four and fi ve above interchangeably. That is, 
authors are often unclear in any case whether “chance” might refer to un-
usual events that disrupt current trends—such as fl oods, earthquakes, and so 
forth, or “forces” that act “contrary” to selection. For instance, Stebbins ar-
gued that certain correlations between various morphological characteristics 
are so strong as to rule out “their origin by chance,” which is to say that they 
are unlikely to be due to chance fi xation of alleles and more likely to be due to 
selection. In other words, when a correlation between environment and trait 
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is strong, synthesis authors were more likely than not to expect an explanation 
that might appeal to natural selection.
Finally, one general trend we noticed in the literature surveyed below is 
that the frequency of appeals to chance in the sense of drift as an explanatory 
factor in evolution appears to shift back and forth from the early to the later 
synthesis. While early synthesis authors like Fisher and Haldane thought drift 
to be a relatively unimportant factor in adaptive evolution, Wright’s emphasis 
on drift infl uenced Dobzhansky’s fi rst edition of Genetics and the Origin of 
Species (1937), which exhibits an emphasis on chance factors, particularly in 
speciation. Dobzhansky’s appeal to chance factors (e.g., isolation and drift), 
in explanations of speciation and nonadaptive diff erences between species, 
was far more common in the 1937 edition of Genetics and the Origin of Species 
than in the 1951 edition. A shift in emphasis toward selection over drift as a 
major factor in evolution in later editions supports Gould’s (1983) thesis that 
there was a “hardening” of the synthesis, or progressively greater emphasis 
on adaptation and selection. With this overview in mind, we now off er a his-
torical perspective on how each synthesis author viewed chance in evolution.
T h e  E a r ly  S y n t h e s i s
This period—roughly 1918– 35—is when Haldane, Fisher, and Wright devel-
oped a general mathematical representation of Darwinian evolution in pop-
ulations, on a Mendelian theory of inheritance. Evolution was represented 
as changes in the relative frequency of genes, due to selection, mutation, mi-
gration, and drift, or random sampling of alleles, from one generation to the 
next. All saw themselves as resisting views that they understood as in tension 
with orthodox Darwinism: Lamarckian, “orthogenetic,” and other “directed” 
views of evolution. Such theories invoked factors outside of mere selection, 
mutation, migration, and drift as shaping the direction or character of change 
in populations over time. All argued that selection on slightly varying charac-
ters was suffi  cient (over evolutionary time) to generate the diversity and adap-
tive variation we fi nd currently. However, Wright believed that isolation of 
subpopulations and “random fl uctuation of gene frequencies” enabled popu-
lations to move to novel “adaptive peaks,” escaping suboptimal gene combi-
nations (S. Wright 1931, 1932).
Chance in Evolution, edited by Grant Ramsey, and Charles H. Pence, University of Chicago Press, 2016. ProQuest Ebook
         Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=4520143.
Created from utah on 2018-07-04 13:11:46.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
hi
ca
go
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
84 Chapter Three
Fisher
Fisher was a “synthesis” thinker in the broadest possible sense; his aim was not 
only to synthesize Darwinism and Mendelism, but also to discover the funda-
mental “unifying” laws of biology, on analogy with physical laws, such as the 
second law of thermodynamics. Indeed, he often compares his enterprise with 
physics and compares the statistical properties of genes in populations to the 
aggregate behavior of molecules in a gas (Fisher 1922). As M. J. S. Hodge (1992a) 
has argued, Fisher was strongly infl uenced by two nineteenth- century fi gures, 
Boltzmann and Darwin, whom he saw as ushering in a new, “indeterministic” 
scientifi c worldview—one that admitted of probabilistic explanations, or expla-
nations that took the action of aggregative eff ects in the context of populations 
of organisms or physical systems to be explanatory. Fisher took Boltzmann’s 
second law of thermodynamics to “transmute probability from a subjective 
concept derivable from human ignorance to one of the central concepts of 
physical reality” (Fisher 1932, 9). Fisher compares and contrasts his funda-
mental theorem of natural selection with the second law of thermodynamics:
The fundamental theorem proved above bears some remarkable resem-
blance to the second law of thermodynamics. Both are properties of pop-
ulations, or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which 
compose them; both are statistical laws; each requires the constant in-
crease of a measurable quantity, in the one case the entropy of a physical 
system and in the other the fi tness, measured by m, of a biological popu-
lation. As in the physical world we can conceive of theoretical systems 
in which dissipative forces are wholly absent, and in which the entropy 
consequently remains constant, so we can conceive, though we need not 
expect to fi nd, biological populations in which the genetic variance is 
absolutely zero, and in which fi tness does not increase. (Fisher 1930, 37)
In other words, in his fundamental theorem, Fisher thought he had discovered 
a fundamental principle of biology, akin to the principle of entropy, though he 
also believed there were “profound diff erences” between the two. Biological 
systems are impermanent, whereas energy is never destroyed; fi tness is quali-
tatively diff erent for every organism, but entropy is the same across physical 
systems; fi tness may be increased or decreased by changes in the environ-
ment; entropy changes are irreversible, while evolution is not.3 And entropy 
leads to progressive disorganization, while evolution leads to “progressively 
higher organization” in the organic world.
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This last comparison, between evolution as a force for progressive organi-
zation, and entropy leading to disorganization, was the core of what Hodge 
calls Fisher’s “two- tendency” view of the universe. One tendency admitted of 
creative change, another of progressive loss of order. Fisher saw the second 
law of thermodynamics and the fundamental theorem as similar in that both 
are statistical laws that capture a fundamental dynamic between population- 
level properties—either of physical system or biological populations. Whereas 
entropy captures the dynamics between energy and time, the fundamental 
theorem captures natural selection’s dependence on the chance succession of 
favorable mutations.
It is no accident that Fisher saw this parallel between physics and biology. 
He had postgraduate training at Cambridge with James Jeans in statistical 
thermodynamics and was particularly infl uenced in his thinking about evolu-
tion by innovations in physics, such as Maxwell’s work on the properties of 
gases. As M. J. S. Hodge (1992a), J. R. G. Turner (1987), Morgan and Mor-
rison (1999) and Depew and Weber (1995) have argued, Fisher transposed 
this mode of thinking, for example, about the physics of gases, from physics 
to evolutionary biology. Probabilistic models were, for Fisher, not an expres-
sion of ignorance, but a way of representing stochastic change in aggregative 
systems, such as populations of organisms or molecules in a gas (Fisher 1922).
Fisher’s major work, The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930), was 
a sustained defense of his interpretation of Darwin’s view: namely, that se-
lection acts gradually on “Mendelian” factors, or mutations of small eff ect. 
Fisher mentions chance eighty- one times in the Genetical Theory. The most 
common sense of chance to which he appealed was as proxy for probability. 
In the Genetical Theory, chance plays an important role in evolution in at least 
three senses. First, on the “particulate” or Mendelian theory of inheritance, 
chance enters into evolutionary explanation insofar as there is indiscriminate 
sampling via the random combination of genes. Second, Fisher (1922, 1930) 
argued that drift, or what he would call the “Hagedoorn eff ect,” that is, “fortu-
itous fl uctuations in genetic composition,” played a role in evolution, though 
he tended to assume that eff ective population sizes were large, and so the rate 
of loss of alleles due to drift was low. The notion of eff ective population size is 
derived from the Wright- Fisher model: a simple model for the representation 
of change in populations over time, which assumes constant population size, 
nonoverlapping generations, and no mutation, recombination, selection, or 
population structure. Essentially, the model is a “null” model, representing 
change over time as entirely due to a random sampling process (with replace-
ment) from one generation to the next. This model was taken to capture the 
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variety of ways in which populations are subject to “random” fl uctuations 
in allele frequencies: for example, fl uctuations in population size, extent of 
inbreeding, overlapping generations, and/or spatial dispersion. Wright (1931) 
and Fisher independently calculated the probability of fi xation of one or an-
other variant of a gene under such a simple sampling regimen.
Third, and fi nally, with respect to selection, Fisher emphasized that fi tness 
is a probabilistic cause of change. Fisher remarks:
We are now in a position to judge of the validity of the objection which 
has been made, that the principle of Natural Selection depends on a 
succession of favourable chances. The objection is more in the nature 
of an innuendo than of a criticism, for it depends for its force upon the 
ambiguity of the word chance, in its popular uses. The income derived 
from a Casino by its proprietor may, in one sense, be said to depend 
upon a succession of favourable chances, although the phrase contains 
a suggestion of improbability more appropriate to the hopes of the 
patrons of his establishment. . . . It is easy without any very profound 
logical analysis to perceive the diff erence between a succession of fa-
vourable deviations from the laws of chance, and on the other hand, the 
continuous and cumulative action of these laws. It is on the latter that 
the principle of Natural Selection relies. (Fisher 1930, 37)
Here Fisher is quite clear that natural selection is in many ways the exact 
opposite of “mere” chance, in the sense that it yields outcomes that are un-
equally probable. Just as casinos can profi t from gambling (on average), so 
too, selection can act to change populations over time.
Perhaps the best way to understand Fisher’s view on the role of chance in 
evolution is to consider his 1934 paper “Indeterminism and Natural Selec-
tion.” Fisher there argues that current physics endorses an “indeterministic 
view of causation,” by which he means both (1) that appeals to probabilistic 
causation have become far more common in science, for example, in statistical 
mechanics, and (2) that physicists endorse the “principle of indeterminism,” 
or quantum indeterminacy. His central argument in this paper is that an inde-
terministic view of the natural world is a more “unifi ed” and comprehensive 
basis for modern science: “Besides unifying the concepts of natural law held in 
diverse spheres of human experience, the view that prediction of future from 
past observation must always involve uncertainty, and, when stated correctly, 
must always be a statement of probabilities, has the scientifi c advantage of be-
ing a more general theory of natural causation, of which complete determinism 
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is a special case, possibly still correct for special types of prediction” (Fisher 
1934, 104). That is, Fisher saw in physics a model for the lawful treatment of ag-
gregative behavior in biology; probabilistic causes are, it seems, no less “real” 
than deterministic ones, provided we consider causal behavior of aggregative 
systems. Fisher holds that indeterministic behavior at the micro level could 
give rise to probabilistic behavior at the macro (see also M. J. S. Hodge 1992a). 
Fisher argues that “only in an indeterministic system has the notion of cau-
sation restored to it that creative element, that sense of bringing something 
to pass which otherwise would not have been, which is essential to its com-
monsense meaning” (Fisher 1934, 106– 7). By “that creative element,” Fisher 
appears to be referring to both to human agency and the capacity of natural se-
lection to create genuinely novel adaptations; he is also replying to the work of 
authors like Bergson and Smuts, whose views of “creative” evolution required 
a special agency. Fisher contested that the creative elements of evolution did 
not require a jettisoning of mechanistic explanation, but of determinism. In a 
deterministic world, the human capacity for choice (and purposive behavior in 
animals, generally) is not real, but rather must be illusory. Yet, Fisher takes the 
purposive behavior of animals to be evident “not as an epiphenomenon, but as 
having a real part to play in the survival or death of the organisms that evince 
them” (1930, 108). In other words, since purposive behavior is a genuine cause 
of evolutionary change (organisms act and interact with one another and their 
environments, thus shaping their own genetic fate) and genuinely purposive 
behavior is inconsistent with determinism (on his view), indeterminism ap-
pears to be the only view consistent with evolutionary explanation. The argu-
ment is a sort of transcendental deduction of the necessity of indeterminism. 
M. J. S. Hodge (1992a) and J. R. G. Turner (1987) link Fisher’s vision for a 
“creative” biology to his political (eugenic) and religious (Christian) commit-
ments. Although these political and religious views do not directly in fl uence 
his views about the role of chance in evolution, they certainly infl uenced his 
views about the signifi cance of selection as a power for improving not only 
society, but also complexity and adaptation in the biological world.
Haldane
Haldane, like Fisher, was a “synthesis” thinker, though Haldane’s biological 
interests ranged further. At one time or another in his life, he made major con-
tributions to biochemistry, biochemical genetics, human genetics, statistics, 
theories of the origin of life, and evolutionary biology. Undoubtedly, his great-
est contribution was his quantitative or statistical interpretation of evolution 
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by natural selection in light of Mendelian genetics as expressed in his series of 
papers entitled “A Mathematical Theory of Natural and Artifi cial Selection” 
(beginning with Haldane 1924a, 1924b, and continuing until 1934), in his book 
The Causes of Evolution (1932), and in his synthetic overview of genetics, New 
Paths in Genetics (1942). In those works, he sought to defend Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection as the primary cause of adaptive evolution. Along the way, 
he gives some telling commentary on his views on fundamental physics, in-
deter minism, and implications for eugenics and human freedom.
In all these works, Haldane mentions chance very infrequently, only six-
teen times in The Causes of Evolution, and the vast majority of these times, he 
is using the term chance as proxy for probability. The infrequency with which 
Haldane discusses chance suggests that he regards it as having a relatively less 
signifi cant role in adaptive evolution than selection. In fact, Haldane is yet 
more explicit: “in a numerous species,” the reduction of genetic variation as 
a result of drift would take “a long period even on an astronomical, let alone 
a geological time scale” (Haldane 1932, 117). For example, Haldane consid-
ers Elton’s (1924) appeal to chance in explaining the evolution of the arctic 
fox in Kamchatka. Elton argued that on a fairly regular basis, modern arctic 
foxes suff er catastrophic population loss, or regular incidences of random ex-
tinction. As a consequence, eff ective population size for the arctic fox is very 
low. So the eff ect of drift should be large. In eff ect, Elton argues that random 
extinction is a signifi cant cause of evolutionary changes in the fox. Haldane 
objects to this line of reasoning on the grounds that even with such drastic re-
duction in population size, the chance of loss of an allele is small, and ecologi-
cal conditions could change dramatically throughout. In his view, such highly 
variable ecological conditions likely played a more signifi cant role in the arctic 
fox’s current state than drift. In sum, Haldane claims that “random extinction 
has probably played a very subordinate part in evolution” (Haldane 1932, 117).
One last point is worth mentioning. On the role of chance in mutation, 
Haldane makes the following (somewhat obscure) comment: “Muller has 
discovered how to control the rate of mutation, and it is clear that mutation 
is accidental rather than providential” (Haldane 1942, 20). Haldane here is 
making reference to the role of radiation in inducing mutation. With the pub-
lication of the paper “On the Nature of Gene Mutation and Gene Structure” 
by Timoféeff - Ressovsky, Zimmer, and Delbrück in 1935 (known as the Three- 
Man Paper; translation in Sloan and Fogel 2011), most geneticists, Haldane in-
cluded, at this time would have known that irradiation increases the mutation 
rate, proportional to the applied dose, though exactly how this happened was 
relatively unknown. What Haldane means by “accidental” here, in contrast to 
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“providential,” seems to trade on two senses of the term: fi rst, that whether a 
given mutation occurs at one place or another on the chromosome is a matter 
of chance, and second, that mutations are by and large likely not to be advan-
tageous (see Merlin, this volume, chap. 7, for a discussion of recent research 
on mutation). So, while this is far from explicit, Haldane seems to think the 
chance of an advantageous mutation’s arising is more or less a product of in-
deterministic forces, or, at least not “providential” ones.
Wright
Sewall Wright is best known for his “shifting balance” theory of evolution, 
which he outlined in a series of papers between 1930 and 1932 (S. Wright 1930, 
1931, 1932). Wright’s arguments in these papers were hugely infl uential in both 
the early and the late synthesis. Particularly infl uential was his metaphor of 
the adaptive landscape, a multidimensional representation of fi tness (in both 
individuals and populations) as a product of diff erent combinations of genes. 
Wright’s views about the relative importance of chance in evolution are best 
seen within the context of his shifting balance theory.
The shifting balance theory was Wright’s answer to what he understood 
to be the “central question” of evolution. Wright noticed in his work on the 
evolution of coat color in mammals, and in his work at the USDA, that mass 
selection is eff ective but does not result in optimal traits. How then can gen-
uinely novel gene combinations arise? Wright conducted experiments that 
suggested that inbreeding in general leads to a decline in fi tness but can also 
lead to novel trait combinations. He became convinced of the advantages of 
combining selection with inbreeding within herds, followed by crossbreed-
ing. The isolation of small subpopulations, followed by migration and thus 
shifting an entire population to new “adaptive peaks,” was thus a way to 
answer the problem of how novel adaptive gene combinations might come 
about. Hodge nicely sums up Wright’s central question (and answer) thus: 
“Under what statistical or populational conditions is this cumulative change 
most rapid, continual and irreversible, with or without environmental varia-
tion or change? Wright’s answer is: When a large population is broken up into 
small local subpopulations with only a little interbreeding among those sub-
populations, and when there is inbreeding, random drift and selection within 
those subpopulations, and when one or more subpopulations having indi-
viduals with selectively favored, superior gene combinations exports those 
individuals to other subpopulations and so contributes to transforming the 
whole population, the entire species” (M. J. S. Hodge 2011, 31).
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As is clear from the above, chance plays multiple roles in Wright’s shifting 
balance scenario, at various levels as well as stages of the evolutionary process. 
There is chance fi xation of novel gene combinations in subpopulations, as 
well as the chance spread of these novel adaptive combinations through the 
entire population.
In the 1931 and 1932 papers, Wright mentions chance a total of thirty- two 
times; 63 percent of the time he refers to chance as probability and 37 percent 
of the time he refers to chance as randomness. He uses the word chance far 
and away more than anyone else, and he also uses it at higher rates. Although 
Wright speaks of chance playing a role in evolution in many diff erent ways, 
he is most distinctive among all the early synthesis authors in seeing a role for 
drift in adaptive evolution.
Wright defi nes drift as the process by which “merely by chance, one or the 
other of the allelomorphs may be expected to increase its frequency in a given 
generation” (S. Wright 1931, 106, emphasis added). Similarly, in his 1932 pa-
per, Wright defi nes drift as the process whereby “gene frequency in a given 
generation is in general a little diff erent one way or the other from that in the 
preceding, merely by chance” (1932, 360, emphasis added). Thus, “merely by 
chance” refers to two distinct classes of causes: segregation/recombination, 
and reproductive stochasticity: “If the population is not indefi nitely large, an-
other factor must be taken into account: the eff ects of accidents of sampling 
among those that survive and become parents in each generation and among 
the germ cells of these” (ibid.). By “accidents of sampling,” Wright is referring 
to the fact that in diploid organisms, one of two copies of an allele is randomly 
passed from each parent to an off spring as a result of recombination during 
meiosis. Alternatively, reproductive stochasticity concerns the possibility 
that, just by chance, some parents may have more off spring than others. As 
Wright puts it, “The conditions of random sampling of gametes will seldom 
be closely approached. The number of surviving off spring left by diff erent 
parents may vary tremendously either through selection or merely accidental 
causes” (1931, 111, emphasis added). By “accidental causes,” Wright appears to 
be referring to what we have called “contingent” events—for instance, living 
on the north rather than the south face of a mountain.
L a t e r  S y n t h e s i s
What we are calling the later synthesis was the period from roughly 1935 to 
1950, during which there was an institutional reorganization of the fi eld of 
biology, which involved the founding of the Society for the Study of Evo-
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lution and the associated journal Evolution, as well as the organization of a 
variety of interdisciplinary conferences and book series, to promote evolution 
as a subject of study and to link existing disciplines—systematics, paleontol-
ogy, and genetics. Though participants disagreed about which questions are 
most central to evolutionary biology, as well as which answers are most likely, 
all generally agreed on the consistency of the new genetics with a “Darwin-
ian” view of evolution. What this Darwinian view amounted to was subject 
to various nuances, but all agreed on what Gould (2002) has called the “fun-
damental principles of Darwinian logic”: that selection acts by and large on 
individual organisms, that selection leads to both genetic changes in popu-
lations (microevolution) and speciation (macroevolution), and that the very 
same causes of evolution in populations were responsible for the divergence 
of species and lineages. Moreover, all saw themselves as responding to various 
“opponents” to this “Darwinian” view, including anti- evolutionists, as well as 
“orthogenicists” and neo- Lamarckians. The core commitments of many of 
the latter synthesis authors were as follows:
• First, they saw their work as providing a “Darwinian” alternative to “di-
rected” or “orthogenetic” views of evolution, according to which evolution 
has a predetermined direction.
• Second, they held that the origin (mutation) and sorting (recombination) 
of genes are in some sense chance or random processes.
• Third, all viewed natural selection as a probabilistic cause of adaptive 
change in populations.
• Fourth, all took the current distribution of species and adaptations as, in 
large part, a matter of contingency, both in terms of when and where muta-
tions arise and are sorted in meiosis, and in terms of which environmental 
challenges are presented, that is, whether “contingent” events like storms, 
fl oods, and natural disasters were more or less in operation in the ecology 
and evolution of any lineage.
Dobzhansky
Genetics and the Origin of Species (1937) is a survey of biological work from 
genetics, population genetics, ecology, and natural history, as it bears on the 
fundamental problem of species’ origins. In the fi rst edition, Dobzhansky sees 
a signifi cant role for chance in evolution, a role signifi cantly diminished in the 
third (1951) edition. Dobzhansky speaks of chance operating in the spontane-
ous modifi cation of chromosome structure, the distribution of chromosomes 
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during meiosis, and migration patterns and isolation of populations; and as 
featuring signifi cantly in the fi xation and loss of genes through random mat-
ing in small isolated populations.
One of Dobzhansky’s central goals in 1937 was to defend the view that 
microevolution is suffi  cient for macroevolution. Dobzhansky argued that mu-
tation is necessary, but no single mutation is suffi  cient for species level change. 
He argues:
Species diff er from each other usually by many genes; hence, a sudden 
origin of a species by mutation, in one thrust, would demand a simul-
taneous mutation of numerous genes. Assuming that two species diff er 
in only 100 genes and taking the mutation rate of individual genes to 
be as high as 1:10,000, the probability of a sudden origin of a new spe-
cies would be 1 to 10,000100. This is not unlike assuming that water in a 
kettle placed on a fi re will freeze, an event which is, according to the new 
physics, not altogether impossible, but improbable indeed. (Dobzhan-
sky 1937, 40)
Dobzhansky has a particular target in mind in this argument: the saltation-
ist or “mutationist” view, defended by authors such as DeVries and Bateson. 
Interestingly enough, the argument itself appeals to improbability, and this 
was a rationale that many synthesis authors used to discredit defenders of 
“mutationist” or “orthogenic” theories of evolution. Though his book came 
out in 1940, Goldschmidt was roundly demonized by synthesis authors (par-
ticularly Mayr) for defending “saltational” evolution, or evolution by major 
“macromutations” (see, e.g., Goldschmidt 1940; Gould 1982).
While single mutations could not suffi  ce to generate novel species, at 
the population level, Dobzhansky thought chance played a signifi cant role. 
Dobzhansky notes that to some extent it is just a matter of luck whether a mu-
tation becomes established in a population or whether it is lost: “A majority of 
mutations turning up in natural populations are lost within a few generations 
after their origin, and this irrespective of whether they are neutral, harmful, or 
useful to the organism. The numerous mutations which persist are the ‘lucky’ 
remainder which may be increased in frequency instead of lost” (Dobzhansky 
1937, 131).
In other words, only a few off spring will inherit a newly mutated gene, and 
in species with a stable population size and a high rate of reproduction, it is 
a matter of luck whether those off spring will pass on the inherited mutation. 
Consequently, the vast majority of mutations, even those immediately benefi -
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cial, are weeded out after a few generations. Only “lucky” mutations persist. 
While Dobzhansky does not use the term genetic drift in the fi rst (1937) edi-
tion, he does follow Wright’s lead, arguing that when a small population be-
comes isolated, simply by chance, some genes will become fi xed and some will 
be lost: “Each of the colonies with very small breeding populations will soon 
become genetically uniform owing to the depletion of the store of the heredi-
tary variability they once possessed. It is important to realize that in diff erent 
colonies diff erent genes will be lost and fi xed, the loss or fi xation being due, 
as we have seen, simply to chance” (Dobzhansky 1937, 134). In later editions, 
Dobzhansky refers to this process as “Drift” or the “Sewall Wright eff ect.”
While Dobzhansky grants that mutations arise “by chance” and that the 
cause of mutation is unknown (“the name ‘spontaneous’ constitutes an admis-
sion of ignorance of the phenomenon to which it is applied” [1951, 38– 39]), 
he does speculate on the causes of mutation (39). Dobzhansky cites a number 
of experiments in which mutation rates were increased with the application of 
radiation, iodine, potassium iodide, copper sulfate, ammonia, potassium per-
manganate, lead salts, and mustard gas (43). However, he is uncertain about 
the mechanism of mutation and hesitates to speculate regarding whether the 
ultimate explanation involves indeterministic causal processes, stating only 
that the outcomes are unpredictable: “X rays, ultraviolet rays, and the chemi-
cal mutagens mentioned above seem to be unspecifi c, in the sense that they 
increase the frequency of change (or destruction) of apparently all the genes 
of an organism. There is no way to predict just what genes will be found 
changed” (45). Dobzhansky seems to downplay the role of chance in later 
editions of Genetics and the Origin of Species. Beatty (1987) has argued, how-
ever, that Dobzhansky always viewed drift and selection as complementary 
and that his later emphasis on selection merely amounts to a shift in position 
on the relative signifi cance of selection and drift. Beatty suggests that while 
Dobzhansky’s empirical work on various laboratory species played an impor-
tant role here, his primary motivators were his personal views in opposition 
to the “classical” versus the “balance” view of natural variation.4 According to 
the classical view, often associated with eugenic ideology, most highly adapted 
populations are genetically uniform, suggesting that genetic variation in evolv-
ing (human) populations is ultimately detrimental. Dobzhansky strongly 
disagreed with this classical view and was fi rm in his belief that variation is 
absolutely necessary for the long- term survival and success of the human spe-
cies. Thus, his ideological commitments in this context may have played an 
important role in his assumptions about the natural distribution of variation 
in most populations.
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Mayr
Mayr’s unique viewpoint was that of a systematist and a biogeographer. Mayr 
believed systematics and biogeography could yield insights into evolution 
that population genetics alone could not. In this sense one primary aim of 
Systematics and the Origin of Species from the Viewpoint of a Zoologist (1942) 
was to demonstrate the import of systematics and biogeography—or, perhaps 
better, the tradition of natural history—to the ongoing evolutionary synthesis. 
To achieve that aim, Mayr hoped to show how this perspective was essential 
to (1) explaining speciation, (2) providing additional evidence for gradualism, 
and (3) strengthening the case of the biological species concept.
Mayr argued that the “zoologist viewpoint” was better equipped to iden-
tify a necessary condition on speciation: nonbiological isolating mechanisms. 
Mayr argued that sympatric speciation was next to impossible and supported 
by little evidence, while allopatric speciation was much more common and 
supported by a rich body of evidence. For Mayr, if there were no barriers to 
random dispersal and mating, populations were unlikely to diverge. By ne-
cessity, then, portions of such populations must be reproductively isolated 
(either geographically or biologically) if new species are to arise. For Mayr, 
most cases of speciation will occur after a climatic (or geographic) event splits 
a single population.
Mayr uses the term chance merely eight times in the entire book, and in the 
majority of those cases, he refers to chance as proxy for probability. However, 
for Mayr, contingency does play a role in geographic isolation (most often the 
result of a climatic event). Both geographic and biological isolation (the result 
of selection on reproductive isolating mechanisms) are necessary to specia-
tion, according to Mayr: “There is a fundamental diff erence between the two 
classes of isolating mechanisms, and they are largely complementary. Geo-
graphic isolation alone cannot lead to the formation of new species, unless it 
is accompanied by the development of biological isolating mechanisms which 
are able to function when the geographic isolation breaks down. On the other 
hand, biological isolating mechanisms cannot be perfect, in general, unless 
panmixia is prevented by at least temporary establishment of geographic bar-
riers” (Mayr 1942, 226). If we attribute the production of geographic barriers 
to chance entirely, then chance plays an equally important role to speciation 
events as does natural selection of biological isolating mechanisms. Again, 
while he does not comment on the relative role of such chance events, there 
is room to argue that they played a fundamental role to Mayr’s view of evolu-
tionary speciation.
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Simpson
In his Tempo and Mode in Evolution (1944), George Gaylord Simpson sets 
himself the primary task of synthesizing paleontology and genetics. To eff ect 
such a synthesis, he focuses on explaining the various causes of the “tempo 
and mode,” or rates and patterns, of macroevolutionary change. Among those 
causes, Simpson places special emphasis on chance, which he refers to nine-
teen times in that single work. Of those mentions, 45 percent involved chance 
as probability, and 51 percent involved chance as randomness. In this section, 
we explicate what causal role Simpson attributed to chance to explain diff er-
ences in tempo and mode.
By tempo Simpson means “rate of evolution,” which he defi nes as rate of 
change of gene frequencies in a population relative to some absolute unit of 
time such as years or centuries. He favors defi ning rate of evolution as the 
“amount of morphological change relative to a standard,” which might sug-
gest a similar but not identical rate of genetic change (Simpson 1944, 3). The 
standard Simpson proposed for measuring rate of morphological change is 
taxonomic in nature. Specifi cally, Simpson proposed measuring rate of mor-
phological change by dividing the number of successive genera by their total 
duration (17). For example, the line of successive genera starting with Hyra-
cotherium and ending with Equus consists of eight genera and has a duration 
of approximately 45 million years. So the rate of morphological evolution, 
according to Simpson’s standard, is 5.6 million years per genus, or .18 gen-
era per million years. Using this standard of measure, Simpson describes the 
rates of morphological change for several genera. In this way, he establishes 
that there are diff erences in the tempo of evolution for diff erent fossil groups 
or lines of successive genera.
Simpson identifi es various modes of evolution: micro- , macro- , and mega-
evolution. The modes are individuated by taxonomic rank. So microevolu-
tion involves diff erentiation within a species but no “discontinuity”—that is, 
“branching” at the level of species or speciation. Macroevolution involves dif-
ferentiation and discontinuity, including speciation as well as branching at 
the level of genera. Finally, megaevolution involves events at the micro- and 
macro- level as well as discontinuity at the level of higher taxonomic ranks 
such as families and orders (Simpson 1944, 97– 98).
Simpson claims that population size plays “an essential role” as “a deter-
minant both of rates and patterns of evolution” (Simpson 1944, 66). He shows 
that population size aff ects tempo, which in turn aff ects mode of evolution. 
Simpson reasons in the following way. First, he accepts Wright’s argument 
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that large populations will exhibit high variability (i.e., potential for varia-
tion) but low variation and, consequently, will exhibit a slow tempo of evolu-
tionary change. Selection will be either weak or strong in large populations. If 
it is strong, then even though the population is variable, selection will elimi-
nate any variation that crops up. On the other hand, weak selection, Simpson 
argues, “tends to end in a static condition of fi xed gene ratios” (67). In such 
cases, the mode will likely be microevolution.
Second, for Simpson, chance plays a role by increasing the tempo of evo-
lution in intermediate- sized populations and, thus, produces discontinuities 
or branching events at the level of species or genera. This occurs for just the 
reasons Wright (1931) outlined. Intermediate- sized populations will exhibit 
variability similar to that of large populations. However, they will also be more 
susceptible to drift. So, although selection acts to eliminate variation, drift 
counters selection and maintains variation. Hence, intermediate population 
size is more likely to produce adaptive and discontinuous evolution (i.e., 
macroevolution).
Finally, Simpson considers small populations with little variability. Small 
populations face the same sort of diffi  culty as large populations: little varia-
tion available for evolutionary change. However, an adaptive mutation in a 
small population has a greater chance of fi xation, or the “utilization of muta-
tions in small populations is more effi  cient, that is, a single mutation has a 
much greater chance to survive or to become universal in the population and 
can do so much more rapidly” (Simpson 1944, 68). Simpson also appeals to 
Elton’s (1924) Random Extinction Model and Wright’s (1931) Shifting Bal-
ance Theory. Random extinction events like fl oods or catastrophes reduce 
population size drastically. Shifting Balance Theory involves variants going to 
fi xation faster in small populations, so the tempo of evolution is signifi cantly 
higher. Simpson argues that the number of successive, discontinuous genera 
produced by such rapid change may lead to higher taxonomic discontinuities 
at the level of family and order (i.e., megaevolution).
Stebbins
Stebbins’s Variation and Evolution in Plants (1950), published in the Colum-
bia Biological Series, is the last in a series of texts often identifi ed as the “core” 
texts of the synthesis. The volume is also in many respects more comprehen-
sive or synoptic than the earlier volumes, frequently drawing upon evidence 
and argument from the authors of both the early synthesis (Wright, Haldane, 
Fisher), and the latter synthesis. Stebbins’s goal in this book is to summarize 
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advances in genetics, cytology, and the “statistical study of populations” and 
their import for the evolution of plants. The book is in some ways more com-
prehensive even than this, as Stebbins often pauses to compare and contrast 
evolution in plants and animals, discussing similarities in genetic “systems,” 
modes of speciation, and the role(s) of population size and structure on evo-
lutionary trends. Much like the Origin, the book opens with a discussion of 
variation and its causes and moves from a discussion of basic systematics and 
trends in variation among and between plants to their bases in environmental 
plasticity and genetic mutations. Second, Stebbins discusses the experimental 
and “historical” evidence for natural selection, pausing to consider causes of 
adaptive and apparently nonadaptive characteristics as well as correlation of 
characters. Third, he devotes a lengthy chapter to genetic systems as factors 
in evolution (where “genetic systems” are “internal” factors infl uencing the 
rate and nature of recombination and thus the rate and direction of evolution, 
which Stebbins argues is infl uenced largely by distinctive gene combinations) 
and moves on to the roles of isolation, hybridization, and various forms of 
polyploidy in speciation. The closing chapters in the book review long- term 
trends in the evolution of distinctive karyotypes and morphology, drawing 
upon both genetic and paleological data.
Stebbins takes a relatively equivocal view about the relative importance 
of selection and drift in evolution. He emphasizes that there is much that is 
as yet unknown about the intensity of selection, heritability, and the sizes of 
interbreeding populations in nature (Stebbins 1950, 39, 145). Even with this 
caveat, however, Stebbins indicates that “in cross- breeding plants natural 
populations are rarely maintained for a suffi  cient number of generations at a 
size small enough to enable many of their distinctive characteristics to be due 
to random fi xation.” In other words, Stebbins takes random fi xation of genes 
in small isolated populations to be rare; for example, it may occur in cases 
where species are either confi ned to “highly specialized habitats” or reduced 
to small population sizes due to extreme environments or unusually drastic 
reductions in population size. Stebbins is clearly familiar with Wright’s argu-
ments, and he characterizes “random fi xation of alleles” as instances of the 
“Sewall Wright eff ect,” “undoubtedly the chief source of diff erences between 
populations, races, and species in nonadaptive characters” (144– 45). How-
ever, he seems to think most populations of crossbreeding plants are relatively 
large, so that the chance of “random fi xation” of genes is likely less signifi cant 
than the eff ects of selection in such populations. Nonetheless, Stebbins does 
note that in the tropics, or island populations, there would be greater oppor-
tunity for nonadaptive diff erentiation due to random fi xation.
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Stebbins mentions chance twenty- nine times in the volume. The vast 
majority of instances are referring to chance as a proxy for “at random,” as 
in “chance fi xation” of alleles in isolated populations. Stebbins views such 
chance factors as potentially playing an early role in the diff erentiation of spe-
cies and genera. Divergence, he argues, is most likely to result from special or 
unusual environmental agents that lead to isolation via “chance reassortment 
of diff erent combinations of genetic factors” (1950, 508). Such appeals seem 
to echo Wright’s shifting balance model, discussed above, transposed into the 
context of speciation and divergence. The second most common appeal is to 
probability, as in: “maximal chance for cross- pollination.” The least common 
appeal is to “contingency.” Most of his appeals of this sort involve a contrast 
with known or suspected causes (e.g., selection).
C o n c l u s i o n
While it is clear from the above that the synthesis authors disagreed on many 
questions, they agreed upon the following points:
• Mutation is the ultimate source of variation, and mutations arise “by 
chance,” where this is understood as “by and large assumed to be of del-
eterious eff ect” (or, not “directed” toward adaptation).
• Meiosis is a source of “random” variation (in sexual reproduction), the 50- 
50 chance of receiving alleles from either of two chromosomes.
• Isolation of small subpopulations is a source of “random” variation, in the 
sense that isolates may in many cases be treated as “random” samples from 
parent populations.
• Inbreeding is a source of chance gene combinations; that is, isolation of 
small (and thus genetically unique) subpopulations can be a source of evo-
lutionary novelty.
• Drift can be represented as the sampling of alleles from a fi nite popula-
tion, such that changes in population size are the main factors yielding an 
increase in “random fl uctuations” in gene frequency.
• Drift and isolation may play a role in adaptive evolution and/or speciation, 
with new gene combinations arising in small isolated subpopulations.
• While it is unknown what the causes of mutation are at the submolecu-
lar level, the role of radiation in inducing mutation suggests, but does not 
prove, that indeterminism may play a fundamental role in evolutionary 
change.
Chance in Evolution, edited by Grant Ramsey, and Charles H. Pence, University of Chicago Press, 2016. ProQuest Ebook
         Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=4520143.
Created from utah on 2018-07-04 13:11:46.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
6.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
hi
ca
go
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
Anya Plutynski, Kenneth Blake Vernon, Lucas John Matthews, and Daniel Molter 99
• Contingent events play a signifi cant role in macroevolutionary change—for 
example, due to catastrophic events such as geological and/or climatologi-
cal changes, yielding extinctions, isolation of species/genera, and/or vari-
able rates of macroevolutionary change.
In sum, synthesis authors shared a set of core commitments about the 
role(s) of chance in evolution. They agreed that chance plays an important 
explanatory role in evolution and that appeals to chance are not simply an 
acknowledgment of ignorance. Rather, appeals to chance (and its cognates) 
were to be interpreted as proxy for appeals to probability, random sampling, 
contingent events, or events in contrast to selection. Where they disagreed 
was about the empirical question of the relative importance of this or that 
chance factor in evolution. Some placed greater emphasis on drift than others, 
and, as we have argued, there was a pendulum shift from early to late synthe-
sis; while Fisher and Haldane emphasized selection, Wright ushered in an 
emphasis on drift, which was later superseded by the “hardening” of views 
in favor of selection and downplaying the role of drift. To be clear, there was 
not a philosophical or conceptual transition in the synthesis, only a change 
in empirical views regarding whether and to what extent drift (as a matter 
of fact) was an important factor in evolutionary change. As we hope to have 
demonstrated, reading the works of authors of the modern synthesis is invalu-
able as a way of refl ecting on core issues in the philosophy of biology. We have 
considered at least three interrelated questions that the texts of the modern 
synthesis can help illuminate:
The sense(s) in which evolution is a “probabilistic” theory.
The matter of whether (and in what sense) drift is a cause of evolutionary 
change.
The ways in which chance, contingency or accident is understood to play a 
causal role in evolutionary change, according to the synthesis authors.
Do these views provide us with insights into current debates among philoso-
phers of biology, for example, about whether or not we ought to view natural 
selection (or drift) as causal? We begin with a caveat. It is our view that one 
should be extremely wary of reading philosophical claims back into historical 
texts, when these are not made explicit. Only rarely did these fi gures engage 
in explicit commentary on causation, metaphysics, indeterminism and deter-
minism, or their relevance to biology. When they did, they were often quite 
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circumspect. Given how little they knew yet about mechanisms of inheritance 
in 1930, for instance, Haldane was very careful not to speculate as to how and 
why mutations arise, or whether their “random” character had anything to 
do with fundamental indeterminism. He was very careful to clarify that by the 
expression “mutations arise by chance,” he meant “by chance with respect to 
fi tness.” In other words, mutations were not by and large fi tness enhancing 
and did not arise in response to environmental conditions, as some Lamarck-
ians claimed. When speaking of “random” events, synthesis authors were 
by and large very careful to specify what they meant, noting what empirical 
conditions would be of relevance to assessment of such claims. For example, 
Haldane explains: “By a population ‘mating at random,’ I do not mean one 
practicing sexual promiscuity, but one in which an individual is no more and 
no less likely to mate with a relative than an unrelated person, and no more 
and no less likely to mate with a person heterogeneous for the same reces-
sive gene as himself than with a homozygous normal” (Haldane 1942, 149). 
That is, terms like chance or random, for these authors, by and large referred 
to very specifi c conditions, or facts about mating regimes, geographical iso-
lation, or environmental contingencies, not “ignorance.” So one should not 
read appeals to chance as asserting theories about the fundamental nature of 
the physical universe, such as commitments to fundamental indeterminism.
Nor should we attempt to read metaphysical presuppositions into math-
ematical models. It is certainly possible to agree upon how to represent evo-
lutionary change in populations in mathematical terms and yet fundamen-
tally disagree on questions ranging from whether natural selection or drift is a 
cause or not, to whether or not causation is acting at one or another temporal 
or spatial scale (as long- standing debates about levels and units of selection at-
test). That is, very little of great metaphysical import should be inferred from 
the endorsement of the empirical adequacy of a mathematical model. It is how 
the model is interpreted that tells us about the commitments of the authors 
of the model. That is, the use of statistical methods and models does not, in 
our view, discourage a reading of these authors as endorsing the thesis that 
heritable diff erences in organisms make a (probabilistic) causal diff erence to 
survival and reproductive success. Moreover, the very fact that these authors 
disagreed about the relative causal signifi cance of selection versus drift for 
evolutionary changes in gene frequency suggests that they interpreted their 
theories as causal theories and that one can (and should) see drift and se-
lection as distinct causes of evolutionary change. As Hodge (this volume, 
chap. 2) remarks: Fisher and Wright saw their “mathematical work as statisti-
cal analyses of causation, not as statistical replacements for causal analysis.”
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However, given their very diff erent scientifi c and historical contexts, we 
ought not to expect that Haldane, Fisher, Wright, Dobzhansky, or Mayr 
would necessarily appreciate how current debates in philosophy are moti-
vated or framed. For instance, one current debate in philosophy of biology 
concerns whether we ought to interpret evolutionary theory in “causal” or 
“statistical” terms. It seems to us that synthesis authors would see this as a 
false choice. Natural selection is meaningfully spoken of as a cause, in the 
sense that diff erential survival and reproductive success is (probabilistically) 
caused by diff erences in heritable traits; but, of course, the overall eff ects of 
this process can be observed only across generations and in populations. So 
it is represented at the population level in terms of population level variables, 
such as mutation rates, selection coeffi  cients, and so on. Thus, in some sense, 
one represents the causes of changes over time as a “statistical” outcome, but 
Haldane’s, Fisher’s, and Wright’s use of “statistical” models to represent pop-
ulation level variation, selection, and drift is hardly grounds to reject selec-
tion or drift as distinct causal processes. Clearly Fisher, Haldane, and Wright 
took them to be “causes” of evolution and did not (at least as far as we can 
discern) have metaphysical worries about whether causal processes are pos-
sible at the population level. Arguably, Fisher’s creation of the analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) makes an implicit commitment to the very idea of partitioning 
causal variables at the population level. Wright, having worked for the USDA, 
would be very familiar with the use of population level variables and the role 
of artifi cial selection in intervening on everything from oil content in corn 
to milk yield. Haldane’s aim in his popular book The Causes of Evolution is 
to demarcate and identify the major causes of evolution (and rule out other 
proposed causes). That is, we largely agree with Hodge’s thesis (Hodge, this 
volume, chap. 2; among others, e.g., Okasha 2009; Millstein, Skipper, and 
Dietrich 2009; M. J. S. Hodge 1992a, 2011) that there was continuity between 
synthesis authors and Darwin regarding natural selection as a probabilistic 
cause of evolution.
We also agree that the contrast between drift and selection, for synthe-
sis authors, was not between noncausal and causal processes but, as Hodge 
puts it, between “causally non- fortuitous and causally fortuitous” processes. 
Indeed, much of the work of the synthesis was to explain and describe the 
diff erences between such processes and how they made a diff erence in ac-
tual populations. They aimed to establish exactly which kinds of empirical 
information would be of relevance to deciding the causes of evolution in any 
case. In fact, arguably one of the central aims of synthesis authors was to dis-
tinguish merely hypothetical from actual causes of evolution, to provide em-
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pirical evidence for the causes that they took to be central, and to provide a 
general mathematical framework for describing such causal processes, such 
that predictions and retroactive inferences about the relative role(s) of distinct 
causes could be precisely and empirically tested. We thus take it that they 
would also agree with Strevens (this volume, chap. 6) that there is certainly an 
objective distinction between drift and selection. Drift was not simply diff er-
ential reproduction owing to causes we have so far failed to discern (pace A. 
Rosenberg 1994). The synthesis authors put a great deal of work into show-
ing how to empirically distinguish the respective roles of drift and selection 
in actual populations. Establishing the role of drift requires, as Hodge puts 
it, “extra, decisive, detailed knowledge, not uninformed ignorance.” As Stre-
vens writes, “The great majority of serious evolutionary explanations citing 
drift are not  .  .  . mere attributions of arbitrary deaths and wonky statistics 
to chance. They rather use mathematical models of evolutionary processes 
to make predictions about diff erential reproduction” (Strevens, this volume, 
chap. 6). That claim could well have been written by any synthesis author.
n o t e s
1. While we do not follow their classifi cation of senses of chance, we were certainly 
infl uenced in our classifi cation by Millstein 2011; Gayon 2005; and Beatty 1984.
2. An initial draft included a section on Julian Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern 
Synthesis (1942). While we think that this was without doubt a central book of the 
synthesis, for reasons of space, we could not include that section.
3. The claim that entropic changes are irreversible while evolution is not is mis-
leading: entropic changes are indeed irreversible (which is why the second law is 
referred to as “Time’s Arrow”), but evolution is also irreversible in its own sense. We 
may, for example, evolve large lizards again, but they will not be T. rex or Brontosau-
rus. Evolution can proceed from simple to complex and “degenerate” back to simple 
again (think of the branch of the annelid worms that became parasitic), but organisms 
are not really reversing the pathway or route by which they evolved. Thanks to Gar 
Allen for this comment.
4. We refer here to the “classical” versus “balance” views on whether populations 
are highly uniform at the genetic level, or variable. These views have been associated 
with Mueller and Dobzhansky, respectively.
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